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1.  HOW  NIHILISM  MIGHT  BE  TRUE  
Some of us, at some points in our lives, are struck by a vision of the universe as 
devoid of value. In such a state of mind, all human striving appears absurd, and the 
grandest achievements seem worthless. One feels that nothing matters.  
It is possible that such feelings have always been around, but they appear in their 
most acute form in the disenchanted modern era, with the rise of natural science and 
the decline of religious belief and traditional forms of life. Nietzsche famously 
announced that “nihilism stands at the door,”1 and many European thinkers thought 
that philosophy’s most urgent task is to face up to this crisis—the impression that 
science has shown value to be an illusion.  
It is a remarkable fact about recent metaethics that one can find in it none of this 
anxiety, even though it has long been dominated by naturalism. Until fairly recently, 
this was because most metaethicists assumed that fear of nihilism is due to mere 
confusion. Hare, for example, offered the following therapy to a young Swiss guest of 
his who, after reading Camus, was gripped by despair at the thought that nothing 
mattered.2 Hare suggested that his guest should ask ‘What was the meaning or 
function of the word ‘matters’ in our language; what is it to be important?’ Hare soon 
convinced the young Swiss that  
when we say something matters… [we] express our concern about that something… If 
the function of the expression ‘matters’ is to express concern, and if concern is always 
somebody’s concern, we can always ask, when it is said that something matters… 
‘Whose concern?’3 
Hare got his guest to admit that he was in fact concerned about many things, and 
the crisis was over—or at least so Hare reports.  
If some antirealist view gives the correct account of evaluative discourse, then 
it’s false to conclude that, because there are no mind-independent facts about value, 
then nothing matters. Things do matter, and in the only way they can—by being the 
objects of our subjective concerns, or by meeting certain standards we adopt, and so 
forth.4 On this diagnosis, the Swiss student didn’t make any mistake about the 
world—he made a simple mistake about language.5  
                                                
1 1976, XII: 129. 
2 1972, 33. 
3 Ibid., 33-4. 
4 I’ll use ‘antirealism’ to refer to metaethical views—cognitivist and noncognitivist—that deny 
the existence of objective evaluative facts and properties while still holding that some things matter 
(I’ll ignore the sense in which expressivists can claim that, on their view, value is mind-independent). 
Antirealism in this sense is to be contrasted not only with realism but also with nihilism. 
5 Nietzsche (1968) similarly writes that “[o]ne interpretation was destroyed: but because it passed 
for the interpretation, existence seems meaningless, all seems futile…” (55); Williams (2008, 137) 
echoes these remarks. See also Blackburn (1985). 
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It’s by no means obvious, however, that antirealism gives the correct account of 
evaluative discourse. Remarking on Hare’s story, Parfit writes that  
Hare accept[s] [a] non-cognitivist view. That is why, when Hare’s friend concluded that 
nothing mattered, Hare didn’t try to remind him that some things, such as suffering, do 
matter.6 
There are plenty of philosophers who will agree with Parfit that the student didn’t 
make any mistake about our evaluative discourse. It was Hare who got that wrong, 
and if his therapy was effective, then it was conceptual confusion that cured the 
student’s despair. The student did make a mistake, but this was a mistake about the 
world: there really are things, like suffering, that objectively matter.  
But as Mackie pointed out a long time ago, there is also a third alternative.7 Parfit 
and other realists might be right about our evaluative discourse, and Hare and other 
antirealists might be right about the world. And if to matter is to matter objectively, as 
realists claim, then if nothing matters objectively then nothing matters simpliciter. 
That various things subjectively matter to us would be irrelevant. Evaluative nihilism 
would be true. 
When Hare confronted his Swiss guest, few metaethicists took this form of 
argument for nihilism seriously. The realist commitments it attributed to evaluative 
discourse seemed, at the time, implausible strong. But this is no longer true. Robustly 
realist accounts of evaluative discourse have since received vigorous defence.8 At the 
same time, it can hardly be said that all metaphysical and epistemic worries about 
realism have been fully addressed. And there is a growing minority of metaethicists 
who follow Mackie—error theorists who agree that our discourse has these realist 
commitments, but who doubt that there is anything out there that satisfies them.9  
Now some of these error theorists restrict their claims to morality; they are not 
nihilists in the relevant sense. Others (and that includes Mackie in some passages) 
write as if the scope of their claims is wider than mere morality. But we can set this 
exegetical issue aside. With antirealists, error theorists argue that  
(1) Nothing matters objectively.  
Some of them think that only moral discourse is committed to such robust 
objectivity. But many realists (and perhaps some error theorists) defend the claim that 
that evaluative and practical normative discourse has robustly realist commitments 
quite generally. They argue that even prudential requirements are strongly objective, 
and that our subjective attitudes never generate practical reasons on their own.10 Some 
even hold that instrumental rationality needs objective input to possess genuine 
normativity.11  
These metaethicists hold that 
(2) For something to matter just is for it to matter objectively. 
And from (1) and (2), it simply follows that 
(3) Nothing matters. 
                                                
6 2006, 326. 
7 Mackie,1977, ch. 1. 
8 Shafer-Landau, 2003; Huemer, 2006; Enoch, 2011. Parfit 2011 defends similar claims, although 
he would prefer not to be described as a realist. 
9 See e.g. Joyce, 2001; Joyce and Kirchin, 2010; Streumer, 2013; Olson, 2014. 
10 Bedke, 2010; Parfit, 2011. 
11 Korsgaard, 1996; Broome, 1999; Raz, 2005.  
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It’s not particularly surprising that few metaethicists explicitly endorse both (1) 
and (2). But each of these claims has been supported by powerful and independent 
arguments. And if both are correct, then the Swiss guest was right, and nothing really 
matters.12 
To make things worse (if that’s the right word), the error-theoretical argument for 
nihilism outlined above is merely one way in which nihilism might be true. There are 
others: for example, perhaps our evaluative discourse commits us to agreement in 
ideal conditions, but no such agreement is forthcoming.13 And nihilism may be a 
possibility even on some antirealist views,14 and can also be endorsed on purely 
substantive grounds. 
A sober assessment of the state of play in current metaethics therefore suggests 
that unqualified evaluative nihilism is not a crazy view, and may even be true. 
Nihilism may no longer grip the St. Petersburg underground or Parisian cafés, but its 
prospects have never seemed brighter. 
It would be hard, however, to find much anxiety about these developments. This 
is because many contemporary philosophers also appear to disagree with Camus and 
the Swiss student on a further issue. They disagree about what follows from the truth 
of nihilism. They appear to think that the real confusion is to think that anything very 
exciting follows from nihilism, let alone grounds for despair. Nihilism is seen as a 
second-order view, which needn’t make any difference to the substance of evaluative 
practice. Even if nothing matters, everything would, and perhaps even should, go on 
pretty much the same as before.  
My aim here is to clarify what is at stake in the question of nihilism. I will argue 
that the complacency about it in current metaethics is misguided. It is very unlikely, at 
best, that things would go on as before, if we came to believe in nihilism without 
reservation. And although familiar forms of existentialist anxiety are indeed confused, 
this doesn’t mean that there is nothing to fear in nihilism.15 
                                                
12 Some would reply: ‘If accepting (2) would entail (3), then, since some things clearly do matter, 
then there’s no reason to worry about nihilism. We should reject (2), and go antirealist.’ Since I’m not 
arguing that nihilism is true, I needn’t show that this response fails. But I don’t think we can be 
confident enough that it works to simply rule out nihilism. To begin with, (2) is a claim about our 
discourse, a claim that might be supported by strong conceptual evidence. But that something matters 
surely isn’t a conceptual claim and it is unclear how it could overturn the direct evidence for (2) 
(though perhaps it could overturn the arguments for (1)). Moreover, this argument assumes that we are 
confident that some things matter, or more confident than in the arguments for (1) and (2). This may be 
true of some of us but it obviously isn’t true of some error theorists, or those in the grip of an 
existentialist crisis. As for those who are confident in this way there are, as Olson (2014, 139-148) 
points out, debunking explanations of such convictions. I should add, however, that the core argument 
I’ll be developing doesn’t even require that nihilism might be true; it just requires that it’s possible for 
us to believe it is (or likely to be) true.  
13 Smith, 2006, 101; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2006, 54-55. 
14 Sinnott-Armstrong (2006) explains how (moral) nihilism is compatible with both expressivism 
and constructivism (56-56). Blackburn (1996) comes close to conceding that nihilism is possible on his 
expressivist view but suggests we can rule it out on pragmatic grounds because it will cause ‘paralysis’ 
(94). While I don’t think we can rule out nihilism in this way, I’ll later develop a similar pragmatic 
argument.   
15 Blackburn (1985) famously argues that if after concluding that our moral discourse suffers from 
systematic error we will nevertheless still go on as before, as Mackie thought, then this casts doubt on 
the idea that our discourse is really in error. I disagree: if someone persuaded by solipsism concluded 
that he should nevertheless keep treating the (mindless) people around him as before, this won’t show 
that our discourse isn’t committed to the existence of other minds. But in any event, if the argument I 
will develop here is correct, then the antecedent of Blackburn’s conditional is false: we won’t go on as 
before, if we came to believe that nothing matters.  
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I shall proceed as follows. I shall begin by clarifying what it would mean for 
nihilism to be true (§2). I’ll then consider what would follow from the truth of 
nihilism. I’ll argue that it makes no sense to think that we should feel despair if we 
conclude that nothing matters, and little reason to think we would feel such despair 
(§3). I will then turn to consider what is likely to follow from genuinely believing that 
nothing matter. I will argue that if widely held assumptions about our normative 
psychology are correct, we will not go on as before after coming to believe in 
nihilism. Instead, such belief is likely to have a dramatic effect on our subjective 
concerns (§4). I will then briefly explore what impact this would have on our lives 
(§5). This, then, is what we should really fear: not nihilism itself, but (mistaken) 
belief in nihilism. I will conclude by arguing that, in Pascalian fashion, this gives us 
reason to avoid believing in nihilism (§6). 
2.  NIHILISM  EXPLAINED  
When someone feels, or fears, that nothing matters, they rarely have any terribly 
precise metaethical position in mind. But the basic idea is clear enough.  
To think that nothing matters isn’t, of course, to deny that many things matter, 
and matter greatly, to many people: pain and happiness, death, prosperity, kindness, 
cancer, and genocide, to name just a few. To think that nothing matter is to deny that 
any of these things—or anything else—really matters, that any of these things 
actually deserves our attention or concern. Nothing is worth doing or caring about. 
In the first instance, we can understand this as a claim about value: evaluative 
nihilism is the claim that  
(4) Nothing is good or bad. 
On this view, we cannot truly ascribe value properties—properties such as being 
valuable, good, bad, better or worse—to anything. Put differently, evaluative nihilism 
is the claim that  
(5) All evaluative propositions are false. 
By value, I mean final value—whether something is desirable or worth caring 
about as an end—as well as whatever instrumental value would derive from it.16 This 
sense of value has an inherent normative dimension: if something has final value, then 
there are normative reasons to value it (by promoting or respecting it, etc.). Thus, if 
pleasure is good, then we have reason to seek pleasure. But if pleasure isn’t good (if it 
has no value), then we don’t have such reasons. Now if all practical reasons have their 
source in value (as is claimed, for example, by some consequentialists) then no 
practical reasons would remain. Evaluative nihilism would imply practical nihilism—
the view that  
(6)  We have no reasons to do, want, or feel anything. 
There are, however, views of practical reason that recognize reasons for action 
that don’t have their source in value—think of common ways of understanding 
deontological constraints. To the extent that such value-independent reasons exist, 
then evaluative nihilism won’t imply practical nihilism.  
On one influential view, claims about value are to be understood, not as 
                                                
16 There are also other senses of value. Many things have merely functional value. Some forks are 
better than others. They would still be better, as forks, even in a world in which nothing had final 
value. But when someone worries that nothing matters, they are not lamenting the lack of good cutlery. 
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generating claims about reasons, but as reducible to such claims.17 If this fitting 
attitude view of value is correct, then evaluative nihilism doesn’t only imply a 
negative claim about reasons but is such a claim. On this view, practical nihilism 
would imply evaluative nihilism. But the reverse still won’t be true: even if value can 
be reduced to reasons, evaluative nihilism won’t imply practical nihilism so long as 
there are value-independent practical reasons. 
So evaluative nihilism and practical nihilism are at least in principle independent 
views. In what follows, however, I will set this aside: when I speak of nihilism, I will 
mean both the view that nothing has final value, and that there are no reasons to want, 
do or feel anything. I think that this best captures what worries about nihilism 
typically involve. It’s not by accident that Nietzsche describes nihilism both as the 
“repudiation of value”18 and as the view that “[t]he aim is lacking: ‘Why?’ finds no 
answer.”19 After all, if there remained even some reasons to act in certain ways then it 
would matter whether we act in these ways; something would still matter. Moreover, 
the central metaphysical worries about objective value are best understood as worries 
about objective reasons. Mackie’s worries, for example, focus on the notion of 
objective prescriptivity—worries that Joyce develops into an explicit argument 
against authoritative, desire-independent reasons. 
3.  NOTHING  TO  FEAR  
3.1.  Gloom  and  Doom?  
It might be true that nothing matters. This is a prospect that many dread. It drove 
Hare’s Swiss guest to despair. Nietzsche thought that “the realization of general 
untruth and mendaciousness that now comes to us through science ... would be utterly 
unbearable. Honesty would lead us to nausea and suicide.”20 Maria von Herbert, an 
18th century follower of Kant, is described by Rae Langton as coming to believe that 
nothing has value. As Langton puts it, “[t]he emptiness all around, and the emptiness 
inside, are intolerable. That is why she wonders whether her life is worth living at 
all.”21 Von Herbert eventually ended her life. 
But is nihilism really something to fear? If we conclude that nihilism is true, 
should that drive us to despair or even suicide? 
Consider first what it would mean for nihilism to be true. If we take evaluative 
nihilism seriously enough, then anxiety about it makes little sense. For if nothing 
matters, how could it matter that nothing matters? That is to say, how could it be 
unbearably bad that there’s absolutely nothing that is either good or bad? 
When we feel fear or despair, we are normally responding to the perceived 
badness or harm associated with the object of our fear or despair. On some views, 
such feelings also presuppose, or even involve, evaluative judgments. But if 
evaluative nihilism is true, such responses make no sense. As Thomas Hardy’s Tess 
remarks, ‘If all were only vanity, who would mind it?’22 
In other words, 
(7)  If nothing matters, this couldn’t make things bad, or worse.  
                                                
17 Scanlon, 1998, 195-198. 
18 1968, 7. 
19 Ibid., 9.  
20 1882/1974, §107.  
21 Langton, 2007, 160.  
22 1891/2008. 
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There’s nothing to get upset about. If Hare’s Swiss guest suffered from a muddle, 
this was his most egregious confusion.   
And if in thinking nothing matters we also endorse practical nihilism, then it is 
incoherent to think that, because nothing matters, we have reason to feel despair, or to 
end our lives. We can perhaps say that if nothing matters then life is not worth living, 
that there is no reason to go on living. But it would also be true that life is not worth 
not living—there is no reason not to go on living, because there are no practical 
reasons of any kind. That is, 
(8) If nothing matters, there couldn’t be reasons to respond to this fact with any 
emotion or act.23  
So it seems that the poor soul who would follow an argument from nihilism to a 
morbid conclusion would have violently ended his life because he failed to detect a 
simple contradiction. (Though if nothing matters, this of course wouldn’t matter 
either…) 
That such reasoning involves a muddle is an old point. Nietzsche wrote that 
According to ‘nihilism’, our existence… has no meaning: the pathos of ‘in vain’ is the 
nihilists’ pathos—at the same time, as pathos, an inconsistency on the part of the 
nihilists.24 
And Nagel similarly criticizes Camus’s suggestion that we should respond to the 
absurdity of life with proud defiance:  
Such dramatics, even if carried out in private, betray a failure to appreciate the cosmic 
unimportance of the situation. If sub specie aeternitatis there is no reason to believe that 
anything matters, then that doesn’t matter either…25 
Nagel however oddly adds that we can therefore approach our absurd lives with 
irony rather than heroism or despair—a suggestion that would fall into the same trap 
if meant as a recommendation. 
3.2.  Worry  Without  Reason?    
It might be objected that when we feel depressed, and find everything pointless, 
this feeling may persist even if we believe that many things do matter, and that we 
have no reason to feel depressed. Couldn’t we, in a similar way, feel depressed even if 
we believe that nothing matters, and that there is no reason to feel depressed? 
Couldn’t this still matter to us, even if it doesn’t matter in itself? 
In considering this question, we should distinguish feeling that nothing matters 
because one is depressed and feeling depressed because one believes that nothing 
matters. It is only the latter that concerns us here.  
This is an empirical question about what would be caused by belief in nihilism, 
simply taking for granted that this belief couldn’t justify any such response. Now 
belief in nihilism could in principle cause despair—just as it could in principle cause a 
strong case of the hiccups. It’s hard, however, to see why despair and depression 
would causally follow the belief that nothing matters. Such emotions typically appear 
in response either to the value judgment that things are bad in some way or, in certain 
                                                
23 If nihilism is false, then we could in principle have reasons to fear it, if we don’t know it’s 
false. But such reasons are odd since we could have them only if the object of our fear isn’t realized. 
And it’s anyway hard to see why we would have these reasons if nihilism couldn’t make things worse 
for us or anyone.  
24 1968, 585. 
25 Nagel, 1971, 727. 
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cases, to the mere appearance of badness. But why should one respond in this way to 
the belief that nothing whatsoever is bad or worse? Sure, some things aren’t as good 
as they had seemed. But it’s not as if they had lost their value—they never really had, 
or could have had, such value. And if nihilism is true, that ‘loss’ of value couldn’t 
itself be bad, or make things worse. 
Nihilism couldn’t be bad, nor is it easy to see why it should even appear bad, not 
unless one fails to properly think through what it would actually mean. (And it’s not 
as if evolution had selected us to react with fear and despair to nihilism as we 
instinctively fear snakes…) 
So again, there’s really nothing to be upset about—even if we understand the step 
to despair in a merely causal sense.  
 We saw that since evaluative nihilism rules out all value, there could be no 
grounds to feel despair because nothing matters. And if practical nihilism is true, there 
could anyway be no reasons for any such response. Worse, some of the responses that 
have been associated with nihilism may actually presuppose or at least normally rely 
on evaluative judgments or appearances, and are therefore either incompatible with or 
unlikely to causally follow belief in nihilism. 
 All of this may seem to support the complacency of recent metaethics. There 
really is nothing to worry about. But this conclusion would be premature. For as we 
shall now see, these last points about what would causally follow from belief in 
nihilism don’t apply only to evaluative attitudes towards nihilism. They have far 
broader application. 
4.  MIGHT  NIHILISM  MAKE  NO  DIFFERENCE?  
If there is no reason to fear nihilism, what difference does it make? To the extent 
that recent philosophers have considered this question, they have tended to arrive at 
an implausibly conservative answer: that the truth of (and belief in) nihilism would 
have little to no effect—that, for all practical purposes, life would continue exactly as 
before. The basic idea seems to be this. It’s true that for things to matter isn’t just for 
them to matter to us, as Hare thought. But even if nothing matters, things could still 
matter to us. We will go on. And if the same things will matter to us, we would go on 
as before. 
This is what is implied, for example, when Nagel remarks that “we go on in the 
same way even after we are convinced that the reasons have given out,”26 and Mackie 
and most other error theorists defend something like this view, at least in the moral 
domain.27 
If this is correct, it would make a further mockery of the existential despair of 
those terrified by nihilism. Not only isn’t there anything bad about nothing mattering, 
it actually doesn’t even make the slightest practical difference whether anything 
matters!   
At first sight the question of nihilism can appear to be immensely important, 
perhaps the most important question we can ask. But now it begins to seem as if 
nothing at all is at stake in nihilism. 
                                                
26 Ibid., 724.  
27 Joyce (2001) argues that we could go on as before by treating morality as a useful fiction. 
Olson (2014) suggests that even this isn’t needed: we can simply hold on to our erroneous moral 
beliefs. Streumer (2013) thinks we will go on as before because it’s not even possible to believe in the 
error theory. I’ll return to these views below.    
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4.1.  Nihilism  and  Conservatism  
When we discover that some sector of discourse suffers from systematic error, 
it’s natural to think that we should give it up, or at least radically revise it. But as 
many error theorists insist, this isn’t a necessary implication. It’s a substantive 
question what we ought to do in light of such a discovery. For we might, as Kalderon 
notes “… decide to retain the domain of inquiry despite the error involved because it 
is good, or useful, or interesting to do so.”28  
And Mackie and most other moral error theorists indeed argue that we have good 
reasons to hold on to morality, even though it’s merely a myth. Thus Mackie writes 
that he has shown how morality is something we make and maintain, and which 
“there is some real point in making,”29 and Joyce similarly writes that morality, 
although based in erroneous belief, is nevertheless “a justified practice in light of its 
usefulness.”30 
In other words, there might be pragmatic justification to holding on to morality. 
Whether this is the case depends on whether  
(9)  We have sufficient non-moral reasons to hold on to moral discourse and 
practice. 
Such reasons might derive from the usefulness of morality, as Mackie and Joyce 
hold—that is to say, from morality’s non-moral value.  
Now to claim that morality is a useful fiction to which it might be justified to hold 
on is to invoke evaluative and normative notions.31 Since these philosophers reject 
objective values and reasons, these phrases cannot refer to objective values or 
prescriptions. If morality is a myth because there are no objective values and reasons, 
then if there still are non-moral reasons and values, these couldn’t be objective. These 
philosophers must assume, then, that at least some values and reasons survive the 
argument against the existence of objective ones. They are evaluating morality from 
the standpoint of antirealist non-moral values and reasons.  
The situation, however, is rather different when we consider, not moral nihilism, 
but unqualified evaluative nihilism. There is at least one passage where Mackie writes 
as if his argument might encompass all value. He writes that the 
tendency to objectify values—and not only moral ones—is confirmed by a pattern of 
thinking that we find in existentialists… The denial of objective values can carry with it 
an extreme emotional reaction, a feeling that nothing matters at all… Of course this does 
not follow; the lack of objective values is not a good reason for abandoning subjective 
concern… But the abandonment of a belief in objective values can cause, at least 
temporarily, a decay of subjective concern and sense of purpose.32 
Mackie’s response to existentialist angst is peculiar. If his complaint was simply 
that nihilism warrants no such anxiety, and could give no reasons to abandon our 
subjective concerns, then he would of course be right. But Mackie writes that there 
would be no good reasons to do so, seemingly implying that we shouldn’t abandon 
our subjective concerns. But if practical nihilism is true, then, just as there could be 
no reasons for despair, there could be no reasons to hold on to our subjective concerns 
or evaluative practice. Nor could it be useful to hold on to our evaluative discourse, or 
                                                
28 2005, 6. Kalderon, however, rejects the error theory. 
29 Ibid., 227.  
30 Joyce, 2001, 173. See also Lillehammer, 2004; Hussain, 2007, 169ff; Olson, 2014. 
31 For other explicitly evaluative claims by Mackie, see 124, 173, 239.  
32 1977, 34 [my italics]. 
 9 
to revise it in some antirealist direction.33 
As we saw, if nothing matters, and we believed that, then there would just be our 
psychological reactions to that belief. There would be no space left to either criticize 
or recommend these reactions.  
4.2.  Carry  on  as  Before,  If  Nothing  Really  Matters?  
 We started by asking what would follow from the truth of nihilism. As we saw, 
the truth of nihilism has no normative implications. It cannot make the world bad or 
worse, or give anyone reasons to do or feel anything—or, for that matter, not to do or 
feel something. It gives us no reasons to feel despair, or to go on as before. Not even 
to be indifferent.  
 The truth of nihilism, the total absence of all value, makes no normative 
difference. Nor could it make any causal difference. In this sense, it does leave things 
exactly as they are.  
 What might make a difference, a dramatic difference, is belief in nihilism.34 Since 
                                                
33 Köhler and Ridge (2013) aim to find a way around this by setting out a purely motivational 
route from belief in nihilism to revolutionary antirealism. They argue that evaluative discourse has a 
function—namely that of playing “a regulative role for our behavior and emotional economy” (433), 
for example by guiding decision-making and increasing coherence. As they concede, even if normative 
discourse had this function, this would be merely a descriptive claim. To show that we’d still care 
about this function if we endorsed nihilism, they appeal to two considerations. The first is that practical 
deliberation enabled by normative discourse helps advance our interests. But claims about our interests 
and well-being are evaluative claims that won’t survive nihilism. If so then, as I’ll argue below, it’s 
unlikely that we will care about our interests following belief in nihilism. The second consideration is 
that deliberation and therefore normative discourse is inescapable for us humans: we are essentially 
deliberative creatures. But, while this is often asserted, it’s hard to see why, if there is no reason to do 
anything (including to deliberate), we would persist in the hopeless activity of figuring out what we 
have reason to do. Moreover, as we shall see below, there are actual (if unusual) humans who cease to 
deliberate despite possessing full cognitive capacities. However, even if Köhler and Ridge are right and 
following belief in nihilism we would adopt some antirealist view, this still won’t affect the core of my 
argument. For whether we’ll go on as before will depend on whether our current subjective concerns 
would survive belief in nihilism. And they won’t. 
34 Streumer (2013) argues that belief in global normative nihilism is impossible. While, as 
Streumer emphasizes, this wouldn’t show nihilism to be false, it would undercut my claims about what 
would follow from belief in nihilism. Streumer’s argument is based on two key assumptions. The first 
is that if we deny the existence of moral (or generally practical) reasons because of doubts about 
irreducible normative properties, then this also commits us to denying the existence of epistemic 
reasons. The second is that it’s impossible to believe what we believe we have no reason to believe. 
Both assumptions are highly controversial. Doubts about practical reasons won’t carry over to 
epistemic reasons if, as Olson (2014, 155-172) argues at length, the latter can be given a reductive 
account (see also Crowe 2014). Moreover, as mentioned above, error-theoretical doubts about 
irreducible normativity are only one way to defend nihilism; other ways of defending nihilism needn’t 
raise doubts about epistemic reasons. As for the claim about belief, it seems implausible strong. As 
Lillehammer and Möller (2015) point out, it seems, for example, that one can believe that God exists 
even when this isn’t supported by one’s reasons. Our beliefs aim at both truth and justification, but 
surely truth has the primacy. In most cases, when we are in a position to see that p is true, we are also 
justified in believing it. But if global normative nihilism is true then these will come apart. And it 
seems to me that we can, and will, come to believe what the data and argument show to be true even if 
there is no reason to thus believe because the very idea of such reasons is a myth. In any event, if, in 
such circumstances, we will form a mental state that functions like a belief in all other respects, then it 
doesn’t matter, for my purposes, whether we call it a belief. Moreover, Streumer’s argument can only 
show that it’s impossible to believe in nihilism if one also believes there is no reason to believe it. But 
even if both of Streumer’s assumptions are correct, we could still come to believe in nihilism because 
we mistakenly deny one or both of them. In fact, it is possible to believe in nihilism in the sense 
relevant to my argument given that, as we shall see later, there are actual people (albeit with exotic 
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nihilism has no normative implications, neither does belief in nihilism. It doesn’t 
commit you to accepting (or rejecting) any (practical) reasons. It doesn’t even require 
that we stop valuing things. 
What is at issue, then, is not whether belief in nihilism gives us reasons to 
abandon or keep our subjective concerns (it clearly doesn’t), but what causal impact it 
will have on these concerns. Many philosophers who discuss nihilism seem to assume 
with Nagel that even if we came to believe that nihilism is true, our various subjective 
concerns would remain pretty much as they were. Thus McGinn tells us not to worry 
that our desires and ambitions will “crumble under the objective gaze,” because they 
are “resilient enough to take care of themselves.”35 Even if we have no reason to go 
on as before, this might still be what we would do anyway. 
But two things need to be true if we are to go on as before in this way, after 
coming to believe in nihilism. First, we must retain roughly the same set of subjective 
concerns we had before believing in nihilism, and second, these concerns must guide 
our action in some vaguely intelligent way—that is, we must continue to conform to 
instrumental rationality. I now turn to examine these two assumptions, starting, 
briefly, with the second.36 
4.3.  Instrumental  Reason  After  Nihilism  
Nagel writes that if we concluded that practical reason is an illusion, we would 
have to “limit the practical employment of reason to an instrumental role.”37 Even if 
our (practical) normative beliefs have objective content, it might be claimed that once 
we realize that no such reasons exist, we would still be saddled with various ends, 
and, consequently, with instrumental reasons to take the means to achieving them. 
And if so, then we have essentially moved from an objectivist to a desire-based 
conception of practical reason. We don’t need reasons to revise our discourse; a 
simple form of desire-based practical reason is simply what’s left once objectivism 
drops out. 
One problem with this suggestion is that it assumes an understanding of 
instrumental reason that has been challenged.38 On some recent views, instrumental 
rationality depends for its normativity on the existence of prior objective reasons: we 
have no reasons to take the means to our ends if these ends are themselves worthless. 
To conform to instrumental rationality, we don’t need to pursue these worthless 
ends—we could simply give them up. But even if we did keep these ends, this might 
not matter, on some views, since without objective reasons we would have no reason 
to be rational. Instrumental rationality would no longer have any normative force. 
After all, if nothing matters, one thing that doesn’t matter if whether we are rational. 
Finally, if it’s not objective norms but normativity itself that is metaphysically 
problematic, then, so long as the normativity involved in instrumental reason cannot 
be given a reductive understanding, it should be just as problematic. If any of these 
views is correct, then even instrumental reason won’t survive practical nihilism. 
                                                                                                                                      
neural disorders) who believe that nothing matters. Finally, although the argument I’ll develop is 
largely focused on belief in nihilism, I’ll highlight a weaker variant that assumes only strong suspicion 
that nihilism is true—a mental state immune to Streumer’s argument. 
35 McGinn, ibid. Though if nothing matters, why worry? 
36 To save words, I’ll use ‘evaluative beliefs’ to refer to beliefs both about value and about 
practical reasons. 
37 Nagel, 1997, 116. 
38 See Korsgaard, 1996; Broome, 1999; Raz, 2005; Bedke, 2010.  
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Now these are controversial claims.39 But for our purposes it doesn’t really matter 
whether these claims about instrumental reason are correct. What matters is how a 
person’s psychology would respond to belief in nihilism. If she will continue to 
intelligently pursue the means to her contingent ends, then she will still be conforming 
to instrumental rationality, whether or not such conformity deserves the honorific of 
genuine normativity.  
The relevant question is therefore whether our normative psychology reflects 
these claims about instrumental reason, so that, in the absence of (belief in) objective 
reasons, we will simply stop seeking the means to our ends even if all of our 
subjective concerns remain in place—our subjective concerns just won’t move us. I 
don’t think that this can be ruled out. But I don’t know anyone who has defended this 
strong claim about our psychology, so I won’t assume it in what follows. I’ll simply 
grant that even if we come to believe in nihilism, we will continue to intelligently 
pursue our subjective concerns.40  
4.4.  Subjective  Concerns  After  Nihilism  
Whether or not genuine instrumental normativity would survive nihilism, some 
degree of conformity to instrumental rationality is a necessary condition for going on 
in any way. However, even if we granted such conformity, how we would go on, and 
whether we would go on as before, clearly depends on what subjective concerns will 
survive belief in nihilism. We would go on largely as before after converting to 
nihilism only if our current pattern of subjective concerns survives this shift. 
Now error theorists rightly point out that  
(10)  Believing in nihilism is logically compatible with having exactly the same 
pattern of subjective concerns that one had before one came to believe this. 
This, however, is not what is now at issue. The question we are considering is 
whether 
(11)  Although our evaluative beliefs have realist, objective content, our current 
pattern of subjective concerns will in fact survive our coming to believe that 
all these beliefs are false. 
This is a question, not about what is logically possible, but about what, given the 
structure of our psychology, is likely to actually happen to us, if we came to believe in 
an uncompromising evaluative nihilism.  
This is in one sense an empirical question. But the consequences of belief in 
nihilism depend on our normative psychology: on different views of normative 
psychology, it would have different consequences. I will argue that the suggestion 
that we will go on as before is plausible only if we reject familiar truisms about the 
relation between evaluative belief and subjective concern. And I will draw attention to 
several other influential claims about normative psychology that make this suggestion 
even less plausible. 
4.5  Evaluative  Belief  After  Nihilism  
                                                
39 See in particular Olson (2014) for a forceful attempt to give a reductive account of instrumental 
rationality (152-155). 
40 Korsgaard similarly concedes that, although the ‘practical normative skeptic’ cannot follow 
hypothetical imperatives, such a skeptic would still take the means to her ends (1996, 163).  
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Before we can address the question of the impact of belief in nihilism on our 
subjective concerns, we need to address a prior question about belief. When one 
comes to believe that nothing matters, what happens to one’s numerous substantive 
beliefs about this or that mattering?  
As we saw, nihilism can be understood as the claim that  
(5) All evaluative propositions are false. 
It’s a straightforward implication of that claim that  
(12) All of our evaluative beliefs are false. 
If nothing matters, then we were deeply mistaken in believing that suffering is 
bad, justice good, and so forth.41 To be sure, if nothing matters, it also doesn’t matter 
whether we believe that nothing matters, or whether or not we would continue to 
believe that suffering is bad. But we are not asking now what we should believe, if we 
come to believe that nothing matters. We are asking what effect such a belief would 
have on our substantive evaluative beliefs. 
Now if we persuade someone that there aren’t (and never were) any witches—
that the whole thing is a myth—then we would expect that person to no longer 
believe, for example, that Sarah Goode and Elizabeth Proctor are witches. If he went 
on describing these women as witches, or explained epileptic fits in young women as 
due to their witchcraft, we would conclude that we had failed to persuade him, or that 
he doesn’t understand what ‘myth’ is, or that he’s only pretending that these women 
are witches. But could he come to believe that there are no witches without this 
leading him to revise his prior belief that Sarah Goode is a witch? It’s hard to make 
sense of this suggestion.  
This is a general point about belief. If you come to believe that there is no one in 
the room, you will no longer believe that there is someone in the room, let alone that 
the doctor is in the room. Similarly, if you come to believe that nothing matters, you 
will no longer believe that some things matter, or that suffering—or any other specific 
thing—matters. That is to say, 
Belief Loss. Coming to believe in nihilism will result in our coming to lose our 
substantive evaluative beliefs.42  
I’m not denying that we can have inconsistent beliefs. We obviously can, and 
often enough do. But inconsistent beliefs require special explanation, explanation that 
typically adverts to failure (perhaps even motivated failure) to notice the 
incompatibility of one belief with another, or to confusion or forgetfulness, etc. It’s 
hard to see how such explanations would apply in our case. Could someone fail to see 
that their belief that nothing matters is incompatible with believing that suffering 
matters? And it’s not as if the truth of nihilism is something one might forget, as one 
can forget being told no one is in the room…43 
                                                
41 To simplify things, I set aside here our prior beliefs that various things don’t have value—
nihilism of course vindicates these beliefs.  
42 This claim is endorsed by Smith (2006, 101) and, in the narrower context of moral belief, by 
Joyce (2001, 176, 191-193) and Suikkanen (2013), who argues at length that rejecting something like 
Belief Loss is incompatible with dominant accounts of the nature of belief. 
43 Some implications of nihilism are harder to spot. For example, as I pointed out earlier, some 
authors fail to notice that nihilism applies to itself. And if thick concepts such as cruelty have 
substantive evaluative commitments, this may not be obvious. But most of our evaluative beliefs are 
pretty explicit. 
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It’s natural to think of Belief Loss as reflecting a constitutive constraint on belief: 
that if you believe that p, you can’t also believe what you can easily see to be 
inconsistent with p.44 But while such a constraint seems plausible, the argument I’ll 
develop requires only a much weaker claim: the merely causal claim that belief in 
nihilism will lead to the loss of most (or even just many of) our substantive evaluative 
beliefs. This seems just a truism about the way our psychology works, the kind of 
effect we routinely observe when someone becomes an atheist, or comes to believe 
that there is no such thing as phlogiston, or when you reveal to them that the elaborate 
anecdote you have been telling is made up.  
Belief Loss seems to me eminently plausible. Some error theorists, however, 
appear to reject it. Jonas Olson argues that if the moral error theory is correct, we 
shouldn’t abandon or revise our moral discourse, but should leave it as it is. On this 
‘conservationist’ view, we should avow the error theory in the seminar room or in our 
more reflective moments, but maintain our moral beliefs about the wrongness or 
rightness of various acts in other contexts.45 
Stated in this way, conservationism is a normative claim: the claim that we 
should hold on to our moral beliefs because doing so would be useful. As such it is 
compatible with Belief Loss which isn’t a normative claim but a prediction. And 
anyway, as we saw, if nothing matters, we could have no such pragmatic reasons to 
hold on to our evaluative beliefs. We would have no reasons to do anything.46 
But Olson obviously assumes not only that we should hold on to our moral 
beliefs, but that we would, at least if we accept his conservationism. Yet if Belief 
Loss is correct, then this may also commit us to expecting belief in the narrower 
moral error theory to lead to loss of substantive moral belief. This, however, needn’t 
be incompatible with conservationism if the latter merely involves the claim that, after 
coming to believe in the error theory, we should try to act in ways that would revive 
our flagging moral beliefs.47  
Olson may intend conservationism to mean that coming to believe moral error 
theory needn’t lead to any loss of moral belief in the first place. Even this, however, 
needn’t be incompatible with Belief Loss. If we recognize the pragmatic reasons that 
Olson defends, perhaps this may prevent us from losing our moral beliefs despite 
coming to see them as false. But again, we could have no such pragmatic reasons if 
nihilism is true. 
Olson also suggests that the emotional effect of morally-loaded situations would 
temporarily give rise to the corresponding moral beliefs even in a moral error theorist. 
But this, he adds, is compatible with being disposed to believe that all moral 
propositions are false in the seminar room and similarly detached contexts.48  
These claims seem to more directly challenge Belief Loss. Notice first, however, 
that they revolve around an empirical claim that is far from obvious. If we conclude 
that something is worthless, we usually begin to treat it with indifference. It’s 
                                                
44 Streumer (2013, 195) defends the much stronger claim that we cannot fail to believe what we 
believe to be entailed by our own beliefs. 
45 Olson, 2014, 190ff. For further criticism of Olson’s claims about belief, see again Suikkanen 
(2013). 
46 Olson sees himself as just making instrumental claims about what would be the most efficient 
means to achieve our ends (see 183). But if irreducible normativity is also implicated in our non-moral 
concerns and projects, as nihilism claims, then the argument I’ll develop below means that we won’t 
have the ends which these means are meant to serve. 
47 Something like this is suggested by Olson’s reference to Pascal’s recommendation that we 
should act as if we believe in God in order to come to thus believe (191-192).   
48 Ibid., 193.  
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certainly not generally the case that we are inevitably assailed by beliefs about the 
worth of things we have come to regard as having no value.  
Setting this aside, even this way of understanding conservationism isn’t 
incompatible with Belief Loss. If, on seeing a cat being set on fire by hooligans, a 
moral error theorist can’t help but judge that this act is deeply wrong, it’s hard to see 
how they could fail to go on and conclude that some acts are wrong, and the error 
theory is false (again it’s not as if they might somehow forget that morality is 
supposed to be a myth). To be sure, as the memory of the bonfire fades and the 
arguments for the error theory are rehearsed in a cooler moment, belief in the error 
theory may re-emerge—presumably followed by corresponding loss of substantive 
moral belief, as Belief Loss predicts. So what we have here, it would seem, isn’t 
concurrent belief in the moral error theory and the substantive moral views it asserts 
to be false, but a shift between moral and skeptical modes.49  
Still, might belief in nihilism be restricted to the seminar room in this way? This 
is implausible. We can see how belief in the narrower moral error theory might be 
confined to the seminar room. Not all seminars contain hooligans, let alone cats. 
Nothing morally-loaded need be present. But nihilism is all encompassing. If nothing 
matters, it also doesn’t matter whether one’s meticulous argument for nihilism is 
sound, or what you may add to your manuscript, which, of course, is also worthless. 
Nor would it matter when and why you need to leave the seminar room. If the 
argument I will develop next is correct then even if belief in nihilism arises only in 
the seminar room, its effects may be such that one would never leave it.50  
4.6.  Evaluative  Belief  and  Subjective  Concern  
At present, we have numerous beliefs ascribing values to things. We also have 
numerous beliefs about what reasons we have to want or do various things. We often 
(though hardly always) value what we take to have value, and act in light of what we 
take ourselves to have reason to do. The question is what will remain of this pattern of 
concern, motivation and behaviour once we cut out all (or most) of these evaluative 
beliefs. The conservative view we’re considering is that it will simply stay in place. 
Now it’s something of a truism that  
(13)  Our subjective concerns (and consequent motivation and behaviour) covary 
fairly closely with our evaluative beliefs. 
We normally seek what we value, avoid what we disvalue, and just ignore what 
we take to have no value. As our evaluative beliefs change, so do our corresponding 
concerns. 
These points are sometimes cited in support of some conceptual connection 
between evaluative belief and motivation. But importantly, it doesn’t matter, for our 
purposes, whether there is such a necessary connection or whether this covariance is 
merely contingent. It is enough that there actually is such covariance. 
This covariance has more specific implications. In particular, it means that if 
someone doesn’t believe that something is valuable in any way, then it’s unlikely that 
                                                
49 Cf. ibid. 192, where Olson writes of having “an occurrent belief that p and a disposition to 
believe not-p in certain contexts” (192).   
50 Conversely, if the mere sight of the blackboard or one’s elaborate argument inevitably triggers 
corresponding beliefs in worth even in the seminar, then no space left for talking about genuine belief 
in nihilism at all, as opposed to completely bloodless intellectual endorsement of a proposition (see 
Schwitzgebel 2010, and fn. 63). But I see no reason for thinking that belief in nihilism is 
psychologically impossible in this way.  
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he cares about it. An even clearer truism is that if someone believes that something is 
not valuable, then this makes it likely that he doesn’t care about it. 
For our purposes, we can consider only an even weaker claim: that if we 
previously believed that something is valuable, and therefore cared about it, but have 
now come to believe that it’s utterly worthless, then normally the result is that we stop 
caring about that thing. For example, If you used to think that bird-watching is a most 
valuable activity, but now suddenly find it completely pointless, something you have 
no reason at all to do, then you really aren’t likely to care about bird-watching in the 
same way. You aren’t likely to care about it at all. 
This covariance has obvious exceptions. Few would deny that motivation and 
evaluative belief sometimes come apart. We are, for example, sometimes weak 
willed, and fail to do what we believe we ought to. However, even here, the 
temptations that overtake us are often temptations for what we take to be valuable in 
some respect. Even weakness of the will, then, is often driven by evaluative belief. In 
any case, it’s sufficient for my argument that this covariance holds in most (or even 
just many) cases. 
Now this normal covariance of evaluative belief and subjective concern doesn’t 
yet show that evaluative belief has the causal priority. Subjective concern might be 
prior to evaluative belief, or the two might be co-extensive. We are now, however, 
assuming a realist account of evaluative discourse. And there are two plausible ways 
of explaining this covariance on such a realist account, both of which make subjective 
concern causally dependent on evaluative belief. If we reject a Humean view of 
motivation, as many realists do, then our evaluative beliefs might simply generate the 
corresponding subjective concerns. Without this causal antecedent, these concerns 
would just fade away. But such dependence could hold even on a Humean view. 
Although on such a view our evaluative beliefs are, on their own, motivationally inert, 
there could still be a background desire (or disposition) to desire what has value, 
which generates subjective concerns that reflect our evaluative beliefs.51 In the 
absence of these beliefs, this desire would be inert, and many of our corresponding 
subjective concerns would again fade away. On either view, it would be true that 
when some subjective concern is correlated with an evaluative belief, we normally 
have this concern because we have that belief. 
These are claims about the relation between subjective concern and specific 
evaluative beliefs, or sets of such beliefs. But it’s hard to see why these claims about 
our normative psychology wouldn’t apply with equal force when we turn to consider 
our entire body of evaluative belief. As we saw, to believe that evaluative nihilism is 
true is to come to believe that all our specific evaluative beliefs are false: to no longer 
hold that suffering is bad, virtue good, freedom desirable, etc. But if there is a 
covariance between evaluative belief and subjective concern, then once we conclude 
that all of our evaluative beliefs are false, we should also largely lose the 
corresponding subjective concerns and motivations. 
And if our evaluative beliefs even partly shape our current desires and concerns, 
then it follows from this that we will not go on as before if we believe that nothing 
matters.  
The argument runs as follows: 
(A) To go on as before after coming to believe in nihilism, our current subjective 
concerns need to survive belief in nihilism. 
                                                
51 See Zangwill 2003 for such a picture of moral motivation. 
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(B)  To come to believe in evaluative nihilism is to come to believe that all 
evaluative propositions are false, and therefore that all of our prior evaluative 
beliefs are false. 
(C) Belief Loss: Coming to believe in nihilism will result in our coming to lose 
our substantive evaluative beliefs. [from B] 
(D)  Our subjective concerns (and consequent motivation and behaviour) covary 
fairly closely with our evaluative beliefs. 
(E)  If we previously believed that something is valuable, and therefore cared 
about it, but have now come to believe that it’s worthless, then normally the 
result is that we stop caring about that thing. [from D] 
Therefore 
(F)  If we come to believe in evaluative nihilism, it’s likely that we will stop 
caring about most (or at least many) of the things that we now take to be 
valuable. [from C, E] 
Therefore 
(G) It is very unlikely that if we come to believe in evaluative nihilism, we would 
go on as before. [from A, F] 
To resist this conclusion, one must hold, not merely that believing that nothing 
matters makes no causal difference, but that believing that things do matter, or that 
this or that thing matters, make no causal difference to our pattern of subjective 
concern and motivation. In effect, it’s to hold, 
Epiphenomenalism about evaluative belief. Our evaluative beliefs (and beliefs 
about practical reasons) make no causal difference to our pattern of concerns.52  
Notice that these questions about our normative psychology are largely 
independent of questions about the truth of evaluative nihilism. We are asking what 
would causally follow from belief in nihilism. This is what would follow even if 
nihilism is false. To hold that belief in nihilism would make no difference to our 
subjective concerns, and that we would go on as before, is therefore to be committed 
to an ambitious general claim about normative psychology, a deeply implausible view 
that is in tension with familiar truisms. And such a view is especially implausible if a 
strongly realist account of evaluative discourse is correct, as we now assume.  
I’ve stated this argument in terms of the consequences of belief in nihilism. But a 
parallel argument could be made in terms of mental states weaker than belief. In 
particular, strong suspicion that nihilism is true is likely to have a similar though 
weaker effect on our subjective concern. It’s after all also a truism that when we come 
to strongly suspect that something is worthless, we usually no longer value it 
wholeheartedly, or care about it as strongly. While mere suspicion that nihilism is true 
will have a considerably weaker effect on our subjective concern, such an effect is 
still likely to be significant. And while some may doubt that a philosophical argument 
could get us to genuinely believe in nihilism, surely such an argument can get us to 
strongly suspect that nothing matters.  
                                                
52 As explained above, our evaluative beliefs can make a causal difference even on the Humean 
picture of motivation, through a background desire to care about the good. The epiphenomenalist claim 
above goes far beyond that Humean view. 
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4.7.  Subjective  Concern  and  Value  
There are further problems with the idea that our subjective concerns would 
survive belief in nihilism. To begin with, there is the old view, which is now again 
influential, that it’s inherent to the notion of subjective concern, understood as a 
conative state of a being with sufficient intellectual capacities, that it aims at the 
good.53 On this view, it’s not just that evaluative belief plays a causal role in 
sustaining at least some of our subjective concerns, but rather that all of our 
subjective concerns are dependent on evaluative belief. If this view is correct, then the 
consequences of belief in nihilism would be even more extreme. 
The psychological stakes in nihilism would be even higher if we also tied 
intentional action to explanation in terms of evaluative belief54 or normative reasons,55 
or if we understood emotions as constituted by evaluative judgments.56 On these 
further views, an agent who believes in nihilism couldn’t act intentionally, or have 
emotions. 
There is thus a range of influential views about normative psychology that imply 
a radical deflation of subjective concern, and worse, when coupled with belief in 
evaluative nihilism. Those who hold that we would go on as before must also deny 
these further views. 
5.  LIFE  WITHOUT  VALUE  
If we believe that nothing matters, then we no longer believe that any thing 
matters, or that we have any practical reasons. And this means that all the motivation, 
affect, intention or action that was causally sustained by such beliefs will be gone too. 
You come to believe that nothing matters, and practical reason just stops—it’s as if 
the normative electricity has been shut off. 
What, if anything, will remain? Philosophers sometimes describe a condition 
where one lives by inclination instead of by reason. This is the view that is suggested, 
for example, when Michael Smith writes that  
Desires well up and confidence levels rise without reason or justification and, when they 
do, we go for it… In this way we move forward in the only way we can given that 
rational action has become impossible.57 
This is an image of a life without practical reason, though presumably still in 
broad conformity to instrumental rationality. Unfortunately, this passage tells us 
nothing about the kind of concerns that would still propel such an agent forward. 
What these will be depends, as we saw, on the relation between subjective concerns 
and evaluative belief. The argument so far suggests that when our subjective concerns 
and evaluative beliefs are broadly in correspondence, these subjective concerns are 
often causally dependent on the evaluative beliefs, and will largely fade away when 
these beliefs are gone. So things will not go on as before. How things will go on 
                                                
53 This view was held by Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, and others. For contemporary versions, see 
Scanlon, ibid., 7-8, 39; Tenenbaum, 2007. On some views, desire is itself understood as a kind of 
evaluative belief.  
54 Platts, 1991. 
55 Dancy, 2000. 
56 Solomon, 1976. 
57 Smith, ibid. Note however that Smith isn’t discussing the condition of believing nothing 
matters, but of being unable to rule out that nothing matters. Korsgaard describes a similar state of 
following “the desire of the present moment” (1996, 163), and Williams writes about a state of 
mechanically following one’s minimal preferences (1972, 3). 
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depends on which of our subjective concerns are not tied in this way to our evaluative 
beliefs. This is partly an empirical question, but the contours of the answer seem clear 
enough.   
5.1.  Mere  Animal  Striving  
Writing about what she calls the ‘normative sceptic’, Korsgaard suggests that 
such a sceptic will still have some desires and impulses, since these are ‘supplied by 
nature’.58 The idea seems to be that, like animals, we will follow our passing desires 
and biological drives. And it does seem plausible that our aversion to pain, hunger or 
cold, or attraction to sensory pleasures, are prior to, and independent of, any 
sophisticated evaluative belief. These animal drives and motivations are likely to 
survive belief in nihilism. But our commitment to our moral principles and ideals, and 
even to our long-term prudential goals, isn’t likely to survive. Nor, I believe, will the 
subjective concerns associated with our deepest personal projects.  
Describing a period of existential crisis, Tolstoy wrote: 
My life came to a standstill. I could breath, eat, drink and sleep, and I could not help 
breathing, eating, drinking and sleeping; but there was no life in me because I had no 
desires whose gratification I would have deemed reasonable to fulfil.59  
Religious believers sometimes assume that atheism, thought through to its logical 
conclusion, must inevitably lead to a kind of amoral, selfish libertinism—a state that 
these believers sometimes equate with nihilism. Needless to say, this argument is 
confused. But ironically enough, the causal consequences of belief in nihilism might 
lead in exactly this direction. 
5.2.  Apathy  and  Paralysis  
Such a life, while not attractive, is at least active. But the contraction of concern 
and motivation might go further. Think for example of depression. The deeply 
depressed see little point in doing anything, not even pursuing passing pleasures. 
They find it hard to even get out of bed.  
Still, although the depressed sometimes say that nothing matters, they do seem to 
value (or rather disvalue) some things. They feel unhappy about the way things are, 
they take things to be pretty bad.  
A better example is provided by the clinically apathetic, who exhibit an even 
more radical contraction of concern, but without the sense of gloom and doom. Oliver 
Sacks describes the case of a jovial brain-damaged patient whose “world has been 
voided of feeling and meaning… reduced to a facetious insignificance,” and who 
explained that for her “nothing means anything”.60  
It’s hard to imagine being reduced to a mere animal state, or to mindless joviality. 
It’s harder still to imagine remaining conscious, in full possession of one’s faculties 
and with complete control over one’s limbs, yet completely immobile: perhaps lying 
in bed, mentally paralysed. There are, however, actual people who are in such a 
state—patients suffering from the exotic conditions neurologists call abulia and 
akinetic mutism. Of one abulic patient, it was said that 
His general behavior was characterized by a dramatic decrease in spontaneous activity… 
he made no plans, showed no evidence of needs, will, or desires. He showed obvious 
                                                
58 1996, 163. 
59 1882/1987, 30.  
60 Sacks 1990, 112ff.  
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lack of concern about relatives’ as well as his own condition. When questioned about his 
mood, he reported no sadness or anxiety.61  
The doctor of a 60-year old, formerly active university professor, described this 
patient’s  
capacity to stay motionless and speechless during endless periods, sitting in front of the 
examiner, waiting for the first question, totally shut in a profound inertia and passivity... 
This patient was capable of answering questions. When asked what he is thinking 
of, all this time, he always answered: “I’m just thinking of nothing, no idea, no 
question, no thought at all.” 
Some of these patients recover. On such patient later explained that, when in this 
state, “she did not talk because she had nothing to say.” Her mind, she said, was 
“empty”—or as she put it, “Nothing mattered.”62 
Needless to say, these patients suffer from severe brain damage. They didn’t 
arrive at such a state of paralysis through philosophical argument. I’m not claiming 
that this is what would follow from genuine belief in nihilism. As I said, this is partly 
an empirical question, and I intend only to sketch the possibilities. But such radical 
consequences might actually follow if, for example, the doctrine that desire 
necessarily aims at the good is correct. At the very least, these actual cases serve as an 
antidote to the failure of imagination that can make philosophers assume that self-
consciousness beings like us must be active agents—that we face an inescapable 
practical predicament, doomed to deliberate, to value things, and to act. 
5.3.  Something  Close  to  Death  
I admit that it’s hard to imagine that a philosophical argument could take us to 
anything even close to such states—that a philosopher might offer an argument for 
nihilism and their audience would simply freeze the moment their brains compute the 
conclusion of his arguments, or else shed all of their lifelong projects and attachments 
and lazily sink in their armchairs… But if evaluative belief isn’t epiphenomenal then 
these are at least possible outcomes of genuine unqualified belief in nihilism.63 If our 
imagination resists this idea, this might be not because we cannot imagine these 
consequences following, but because we cannot imagine really believing in nihilism. 
And whether or not the result would be complete paralysis, or mere animal-like 
striving, the outcome would be something very close to personal death. Although we 
would still be alive, our mental lives will have undergone a radical transformation. 
Our concern for the personal projects that gave sense to our lives will almost certainly 
dry out, and the psychological continuity that sustains prudential concern would be 
lost. And on views that identify the self with reason or rational agency, or with 
endorsement of values, even our selves won’t survive this upheaval.  
                                                
61 Habib, 2004. 
62 Damasio and Van Hoesen, 1983, my italics. 
63 It might be objected that since error theorists seem to go on pretty much as before, belief in 
nihilism couldn’t have these implications. Notice that this won’t show my argument to be invalid. It 
would only show that evaluative belief is epiphenomenal, and that widely held views about normative 
psychology are false. But it’s doubtful that the uneventful lives of error theorists support any such 
conclusion. To begin with, most error theorists only endorse moral error theory; they hold that some 
things do matter. Now some may go further. But to assert (even sincerely assert) some radical 
philosophical view isn’t yet tantamount to genuinely believing it (Schwizgebel, 2010). Conversely, 
those who following their conversion to nihilism live lives of unbridled sensuality, or never even get 
out of bed, are unlikely to report this consequence in peer-reviewed publications; as Valery wrote: “If I 
feel that all is vanity, the very thought prevents me from writing it down.” (Valery, 1930, 96) 
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Thus, although nihilism gives no reasons to commit suicide, that may not really 
matter, because just by believing it you might in a sense die. 
6.  WHAT  WE  REALLY  OUGHT  TO  FEAR  
Does it really matter whether we would carry on as before or stop in our tracks? 
After all, if nothing matters, it’s not as if going on as before would be a better 
outcome. So why care about the likely consequences of belief in nihilism?64 
We take ourselves to have reasons to know important facts about the world—we 
believe that knowledge of such facts is valuable. And the truth of nihilism might seem 
to be an important fact—you might even think it’s the most important fact about the 
world. But if nihilism is true, this could not be a valuable fact, or a fact it’s valuable 
to know. Nor could there be anything bad in falsely believing that things do matter. If 
nothing matters, then another thing that doesn’t matter is whether or not we believe 
this. If nothing matters, then all of us live under an illusion. But this illusion could not 
itself be harmful, or bad in any way.  
It couldn’t matter, then, whether possibilities (1) or (2) hold: 
 Nothing matters Some things matter 
Believe some things matter (1) (3) 
Believe nothing matters (2) (4) 
It’s not that these possibilities have zero value—they are, we might say, beyond 
good and evil. 
Things, however, are very different if nihilism is false, and some things do 
matter. Consider first (3). It would be good, or is at least a condition for much good, if 
we recognize and respond to our reasons, and to what matters. Now the mere fact that 
we believe that some things matter doesn’t by itself guarantee that we would 
recognize and respond to what actually has value. But this would be the case if our 
substantive evaluative beliefs do track value at least to some extent, and if these 
beliefs often guide our action. 
The crucial possibility, however, is (4). Its value critically depends on what 
causally follows from belief in nihilism. Now if we believe that nothing matters, then 
we will no longer recognize the values and reasons out there. However, if we carry on 
largely as before, then we might at least still largely conform to our reasons. But if I 
am right, and we would lose many of our subjective concerns, then the result will be 
very harmful. It would mean that we would fail to respond to the value around us, and 
fail to even conform to our reasons. This would lead to many bad consequences, both 
prudential and moral, and might be bad in itself. And if belief in nihilism would lead 
to a kind of death of reason, this would be a further great harm, if our existence as 
rational agents has final value. There is no reason to fear nihilism. What we should 
fear is mistaken belief in nihilism. 
Such a mistake could have disastrous consequences. By contrast, we lose nothing 
by mistakenly believing that things do matter, if they don’t. Nor do we stand to gain 
anything by believing in nihilism even if it is true. This asymmetry gives us, in 
                                                
64 Hussain 2007 portrays Nietzsche as responding to the threat of ‘practical nihilism’—the threat 
that belief in nihilism would sap the force of our drives and desires. This is very much in line with my 
argument except that it’s not clear how, if nothing matters, this consequence could be a threat. 
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Pascalian fashion, pragmatic reasons to believe (or to try to make ourselves believe) 
that nihilism is false.65 
These reasons of course presuppose the falsity of nihilism. If we have already 
been persuaded that nihilism is true, then we cannot recognize such reasons. But so 
long as we don’t yet believe in nihilism, then these reasons have great force even if 
the evidence in favour of nihilism was incredibly strong, even if we thought that it’s 
almost certainly true.  
This Pascalian argument assumes that our evaluative beliefs are broadly on track. 
But are we entitled to assume that? It might be objected that my argument considers a 
too narrow range of possibilities. If a view as radical as nihilism is on the table, 
shouldn’t we also consider the sceptical hypothesis that, although some things do 
matter, our evaluative beliefs are nevertheless deeply wrong? And this means we face 
a broader range of possibilities: 
 
 Nothing matters Things matter  
Our evaluative 
beliefs are true 
Things matter  
Our evaluative 
beliefs are false 
Believe certain things 
matter 
(1) (3) (5) 
Believe nothing matters (2) (4) (6) 
 
But now that this sceptical hypothesis is also on the table, my Pascalian argument 
seems to face a challenge.66 On a robustly realist view, it’s logically possible that 
pretty much anything might be good, bad, or indifferent: suffering might be a supreme 
good or matter of indifference, while scratching one’s ear might be great evil.67 But 
that means it’s conceivable that coming to believe that nothing matters and, perhaps, 
becoming paralyzed, would be an extremely good thing on some scenarios, whereas if 
our evaluative beliefs are false, acting on them may lead to great harm. Therefore, 
even if things matter, it needn’t be better to believe that certain things matter, and to 
act on this belief. 
This objection can be met. Now it’s true that on such a sceptical scenario, (6) 
might be better than (5). Indeed, on some conceivable possibilities, (6) might even be 
better than (3). That might be so. But it needn’t be. We certainly cannot assume that in 
such a sceptical scenario it would be better to do nothing than to act on mistaken 
beliefs. The act/omission distinction is itself a substantive claim we of course cannot 
appeal to here. And there are also many conceivable scenarios on which doing 
nothing would be far worse than acting on our beliefs, even if these are radically off 
                                                
65 Several authors have made similar points. Adams 1995 argues that we stand nothing to lose by 
getting morality wrong, but much to lose if we mistakenly take morality to be an illusion. This seems 
doubtful if we consider only moral nihilism; we could lose much if rational egoism is true yet we 
mistakenly obey the demands of morality. Smith 2006 makes a closer argument, but he is asking 
whether we should suspend all of our evaluative beliefs in light of our inability to either confirm or rule 
out nihilism. And in a way I find puzzling, Smith goes on to describe the resulting state as one of being 
moved by our desires “without reason and justification” (105). Ross 2006 argues that we have 
pragmatic reasons to reject nihilism because it doesn’t discriminate between options. My point is 
somewhat different: that if after believing in nihilism we won’t go on as before, then belief in nihilism 
would be harmful if nihilism is false.  
66 I’m grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this ingenious objection. 
67 See Street (2006); though see Cuneo & Shafer-Landau (2014) for criticism.  
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track. In other words, under this impenetrable sceptical fog, we wouldn’t be in a 
position to evaluate (5) and (6), or indeed any other set of beliefs or courses of action. 
Thus, while (3) is clearly better than (4), we can’t say whether (5) is better than (6) or 
vice versa. More importantly, we also can’t say whether (6) is better than (3), or (5) 
worse than (3). 
Is this enough to address the objection? Not yet, since, if it’s as likely that our 
evaluative beliefs are broadly on track as it is that they are off track, and therefore as 
likely that it would be better to be paralyzed out of nihilist belief than to act on these 
beliefs, then we would have no ground to single out (3) over those sceptical scenarios 
where (6) is better, or (5) is much worse. 
However, to assume that all these scenarios are equally probable is to assume that 
we already are in a sceptical state—to assume that our evaluative beliefs are just as 
likely to be false as true, that suffering is just as likely to be a wonderful thing as a 
great evil.  But why should we assume that? We are considering, from our current 
perspective, what to make of the prospect that nihilism is true. We are not assuming 
that nihilism is true—which would anyway make such deliberation pointless. We are 
now also considering the sceptical possibility that things do matter but our beliefs are 
generally false. But again that isn’t the same as assuming this to be true. In fact, since 
such scepticism would also make practical deliberation about these possibilities 
pointless, our very question assumes at least minimal confidence in our capacity to 
find out what matters, and what we have reason to do (this assumption fails, of 
course, if nothing matters, or if we really are clueless about what matters).  
The Pascalian argument would go through whether or not nihilism was highly 
probable or extremely unlikely. For the current objection to be met, probabilities do 
matter, but only a very weak assumption is needed: that, if some things do matter, it’s 
somewhat more likely that our evaluative beliefs are broadly on track than that 
epistemic evaluative scepticism is true. And I think we’re certainly entitled to make 
this weak assumption, and even something considerably stronger. This isn’t to deny 
that robust realism faces epistemic challenges. These challenges may mean that the 
probability of epistemic scepticism is higher on realism than on competing 
metaethical views. But if we think that we can hold on to realism despite these 
challenges, then surely one thing that follows is that we’re entitled to regard, for 
example, our conviction that suffering as bad as more likely to be true than the mere 
logical possibility that suffering is wonderful or that scratching one’s ear is a mortal 
sin.68  
So I think we have powerful pragmatic reasons to try to believe that things 
matter. Even more clearly, the negative consequences of belief in nihilism give us 
reasons to avoid anything that might lead us to believe in nihilism. We even have 
reasons to suppress any growing suspicion that nihilism is true—even if this suspicion 
could be supported by forceful reasons. In effect, we have pragmatic reasons not to 
try to find out whether nihilism is true. For, as we saw, there is no value in finding out 
                                                
68 To be sure, some argue that if robust realism were true then we would face a sceptical 
predicament (cf. Street, 2006). But even these metaethicists don’t conclude that epistemic scepticism is 
true; they conclude that we must reject realism. Assessing such arguments is beyond the scope of this 
paper. But even if they succeed, they do not threaten the Pascalian argument. Let us set aside the point 
that epistemic scepticism is still at least a possibility even on some antirealist views. Suppose that 
antirealism does rule out such scepticism out. That just means that we’re back with the original simpler 
pragmatic argument. And as I’ve mentioned earlier, many forms of antirealism are compatible with the 
possibility of nihilism. Still, let us suppose further that antirealism also rules out nihilism. But even if 
nihilism is false, this doesn’t mean we can’t wrongly believe (or strongly suspect) that it’s true. So the 
argument gets even simpler: only (3) and (4) remain, and (3) is still surely the better option. 
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that nihilism is true. There could be no reasons to find out that nothing matters. I am 
now suggesting that there are reasons not to try to find out whether nothing matters. 
Isn’t there, however, great value in finding out that nihilism is false? For 
wouldn’t that be an important truth? But even if it is, it’s a truth we implicitly 
recognize through first-order inquiry into the value of particular things—an inquiry 
which, if successful, implies that that some things do matter. 
To conclude. If nothing matters, this doesn’t matter either. But if nothing matters, 
and we believe that, then—although it won’t matter whether anything would still 
matter to us—it’s likely that far fewer things would matter to us. If nothing matters 
then this result of belief in nihilism of course also won’t matter. But it would matter, 
and matter greatly, if we falsely believe in nihilism and stop, in this way, to care about 
the things that do matter. That is what we should fear.69 
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